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1.  Introduction
Many authors have emphasised the role that effective employee training can
play in affecting worker productivity, wages and overall individual career
development.  This attention has varied from a focus on the effect of training on
individual performance (eg the literature on the impact of training on wages ), to its1
impact on workplace and company performance (eg the National Institute matched
plant studies ), through to comparisons of macroeconomic performance (eg studies2
which highlight training differences across countries and relate them to macroeconomic
outcomes ).  Many governments now give a high priority to policies thought to3
stimulate training, either through direct interventions and subsidies of company
training or through support for a "training market" via loan provision, dissemination
of information about good practice and other measures.
Given the importance of training for economic performance, it seems important
to understand what kinds of workplaces provide training for their workers.   In
particular, it has emerged from a variety of studies in many countries that the
institutional environment in which businesses operate affects the process of skill
formation in firms, and may interact with government policies (eg Streeck, 1989;
CEDEFOP, 1987; Koike and Inoke, 1990).  An important aspect of that environment is
the character of employee relations in the organisation.  In this paper we provide some
evidence on this issue using British establishment- and individual-level data sources.
While some of the main factors affecting company training are reasonably well known
(Green, 1993b), at least as far as the 1980s are concerned, our principal focus is on one
specific issue, about which relatively little is understood, namely are there any notable
differences between training provision and receipt for individuals in union and non-
union workplaces?
There are several reasons why one should be interested in the relationship
between trade unions and training practices.  First, there is – in some circles – a
perception that trade unions are bad for employee training, on the grounds that unions
attempt to appropriate a share of any surplus generated by the firm’s activities to
finance the union wage premium:  as such, they hinder the ability of firms to finance
training practices by obtaining this wage gain.  Second, when one considers recent
aggregate patterns in the extent of training and in unionization they appear to move in
opposite directions.  Training in all forms has become a wider spread and more
important form of company practice over the last ten years or so (see Table 1, below).
On the other hand, unionization fell very sharply over the same time period.  Whatever
measure of union presence one chooses to focus on, there has been a sharp fall in union
activity in the British labour market since its peak in 1979 (eg Disney, Gosling and
Machin, 1995; and Millward et al, 1992).  Could these opposing trends be related, with
unions being seen as a constraint on skill formation which, once weakened, allowed
training practices to expand?
A third reason, however, for being interested in the existence of a link between
unions and training provision is that unions have, in recent years, attempted to place
training issues high on their agenda.  For example, Labour Research (1990) stated that,
2by 1990, a number of union officials claimed that they were either bargaining or
consulting over training matters.  The Trades Union Congress (1991) argued that
training should form an important part of a new bargaining agenda for unions in the
1990s.
A fourth reason why the unions-training relation is worthy of study is that not
all theoretical approaches unambiguously predict a negative union impact on training.
There are plausible theoretical approaches that argue that the presence of unions may
actually enhance worker training prospects and lead to improved productivity as
compared to non-union workplaces.  For instance, the collective voice approach of
Freeman and Medoff (1984) argues that, as unions enhance communication channels
within workplaces, this can encourage workers to accumulate longer job tenures (as
they are less likely to quit) and, given higher within-employer career commitment, that
employers are more likely to train workers.  In the same vein, it is also possible that
managers respond to the more formal environment that prevails in unionized
workplaces to set up more formal procedures to identify training needs and this may
lead to further training and a more sophisticated training infrastructure.
In the light of these remarks, we therefore intend to explore the empirical
relationship between training and unionization.  We present results drawn from two
microeconomic data sources, the establishment-level Employers Manpower and Skills
Practices Survey (EMSPS) of 1991 and the individual-level Labour Force Survey (LFS)
of Autumn 1993.  We present results that are very consistent across the two data
sources.  Unlike the predictions of the simple "unions as monopolies" approach, and
despite the aggregate trends in training and union presence, we identify a strong
positive association between the extent of training and unionization at the
microeconomic level.  As training is still rarely directly bargained over (see below) we
interpret this positive association as reflecting the indirect influence that unions can
exert on training, through voice effects and their ability to influence manager’s actions.
These results point to an important role that trade unions play in the process of skill
formation for workers in British workplaces.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we briefly
consider the theoretical routes via which trade unions may have an impact on training,
and discuss related empirical work on the relationship between training and
unionization.  In Section 3 we describe the data sources that we use and present
descriptive statistics on the key variables of interest.  In Section 4 we present our
estimates of the determinants of training from our two data sources.  Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2.  Unions and Training:  Theory and Existing Work
Training and union bargaining
In looking for an empirical association between training provision and
unionization the first question that one might reasonably ask concerns the extent to
which unions are actually able to bargain about training.  Following the major
upheavals of the 1980s British trade unions have been attempting to develop a new
agenda for bargaining and consultation.  This is especially the case, given the trends to
decentralize bargaining, for issues negotiated at company- or establishment-level.  One
key feature of this new agenda is training.  For example, by 1990 a number of union
3officials claimed to be either bargaining or consulting over training matters (Labour
Research Department, 1990).  The late 1980s saw major unions such as the Transport
and General Workers* Union, the National Association of Local Government Officers,
and Manufacturing, Science and Finance develop their own training initiatives in
attempts to encourage their negotiators to discuss training agreements with employers.
Influenced by these major players, and by the belief that improved training and
consequent improved productive efficiency was crucial to the raising of living
standards of union members, the Trades Union Congress announced that training
should be an important aspect of a new bargaining agenda for trades unions for the
1990s (Trades Union Congress, 1991).  The strategy involved negotiating minimum
levels and standards of training, equal opportunities and close involvement in training
decisions, if possible through workplace training committees.  In the absence of
favourable legislation, negotiators were to aim for voluntary agreements along the lines
of proposed training models.  It is probably too early to evaluate whether trade union
strategies on training will succeed in placing training on the bargaining agenda widely
across British industry.  Whether it succeeds probably depends on many factors outside
unions* direct control, in particular on the attitudes taken by companies themselves and
on the public policy environment.  
A detailed study of the ways in which some unions do get involved in training
matters, and an evaluation of best practice in this area, was presented in a recent
Employment Department report (Winterton and Winterton, 1994).  But up to the first
half of the present decade unions had not made large inroads.  For the most part,
management continues to regard training as an area for their own decision-making,
independent of collective bargaining.  The evidence for this comes on one hand from
responses to the third Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, WIRS3, (Millward et al,
1992, p.255), which indicated that training had not been conceded as a bargaining issue
in many places.  A subsequent analysis of agreements reached during the 30 months
following January 1991 showed relatively few such agreements containing provision
for formal consultation over training and even fewer for bargaining over training levels
or content (Claydon and Green, 1994).  Nevertheless, there is some contrasting evidence
that unions may be having an informal role in training matters in some workplaces, a
role which may not always be recognised by management (Heyes, 1993; Stuart, 1994).
While trade unions* direct influence on the extent and nature of training is likely
to have been relatively limited in recent years, this does not mean that their impact can
be ignored.  It is possible that their direct role will increase in the future, and for this
reason it will be important to see how far unions, where they do have a role, actually
increase training. Just as important is the indirect influence that unions have on
training.  Without necessarily bargaining directly over training, the presence of unions
conditions the whole character of employee relationships in establishments.  In
theoretical terms, unions could thereby have either a positive or a negative impact on
the extent of training in establishments.
In their simplest form, the case where the trade union acts as a monopolist in a
competitive product market, formal union bargaining models predict that, because
unions negotiate a wage that lies above the non-union wage, that they are likely to
operate in workplaces that provide lower levels of training for their employees.4
Furthermore, even if one holds wages constant, it has long been argued that the
4existence of union induced job demarcations that permit unions to influence the ability
of management to freely allocate tasks can provide a further brake on the incentives
that managers have to engage in the training of their workers, again reinforcing any
negative effect of trade unions on employee training.
It is evident that these arguments are somewhat simplistic for several reasons,
and that the predictions can be altered if one adopts other approaches, ranging from
small shifts to other models (eg moving away from the union monopoly model to an
explicit bargaining approach) to much bigger moves away from it (eg to situations
where unions actually directly bargain over training).  It is useful to consider several
such departures from the simple monopoly approach to see to what extent they can
modify the prediction of a negative relationship between training practices and
unionization.
In the simplest case unions could have a negative impact on training through
their influence on pay.  Empirical evidence for Britain does show that unions raise
wages relative to the non-union sector, especially for manual workers (for example,
Blanchflower, 1986, or Stewart, 1987, 1995), and this may discourage employers from
paying for training courses.  In particular, where unions raise the pay of younger
workers, this reduces the incentive for firms to invest in their training, since the firms
have to bear a higher cost and with young workers they are less likely to reap the
longer-term benefits of the training as the workers move to other firms.  Ryan (1991)
has shown that one reason why unions might pursue a policy of raising wages for
younger workers rather than a policy of raising training is that it is difficult for unions
to monitor the quality of training provided, especially when much of the training is on-
the-job and uncertified.  In the context of the United States Mincer (1983) has argued
that, in addition, where unions impose "seniority rules" for promotions to higher
grades, this reduces individual’s incentives to invest in training.
On the other hand, unions could have a positive impact of training through their
influence on channels of communication and management and through them to the
level of employee turnover.  Unions provide a "voice" for individual grievances and for
contributions towards productive efficiency that would often not be available for
individual employees (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  In so far as this reduces labour
turnover, (and there is empirical evidence for this in Britain, for example, Elias, 1994),
there is likely to be a longer period to reap the benefits of investments in training, and
therefore a larger return.  Where unions have an influence in an establishment,
employees may also feel more secure, and therefore less threatened by the changes in
work practices that often accompany training courses.  Managers may also respond to
the more formal environment that is engendered by unions being present, by setting
up more formal procedures for identifying training needs and defining skill levels as
required by pay formulas. From all these points of view, it is arguable that the presence
of active trade unions in the workplace may lead both to a greater level of training and
to a more developed training infrastructure within the establishment and the company.5
Against this background, it is therefore of great interest to know which of the above
effects prevails in practice.
Existing work
5Existing empirical evidence is, rather like the predictions of different theoretical
models, somewhat mixed.  Some US work (see, inter alia, Duncan and Stafford, 1980,
or Mincer, 1983) points to a negative union impact on training.  However, even in the
US, some more recent work challenges this finding.  Once one differentiates between
different forms of training one can obtain negative and positive training effects:  Lynch
(1992), for example, reports a positive coefficient on union variables in probit models
of on-the-job training and a negative (and statistically insignificant) union coefficient
in an off-the-job training probit;  Veum (1995) considers seven different forms of
training (two on-the-job, five off-the-job) and obtains positive (and significant)
coefficients on a union variable in probit models of the determinants of on-the-job
training (company training and apprenticeships) and statistically insignificant (one
positive, four negative) coefficients on the union variable in the off-the-job training
equations.  In an establishment-level study, Osterman (1995) finds a significant positive
effect of union presence on formal off-the-job training.
Existing research for Britain in this area is limited, but the consensus supports
the view that overall trade unions tend to increase participation in training.  Green
(1993a) reports a positive significant union coefficient in a training participation
equation based on 1989 Labour Force Survey data for workers in small workplaces (<25
employees) and an insignificant coefficient in an equation for workers in larger
workplaces.  Booth (1991) uses data from the 1987 British Social Attitudes Survey and
reports a positive effect of the presence of a workplace union on training receipt for
both men and women.  And Greenhalgh and Mavrotas (1994) also report positive union
coefficients in their logit training models based on the Individuals Study of the Training
in Britain survey.
On balance, therefore, the British work seems to point to a potentially important
positive link between training provision and union presence.  In our view, however,
the existing studies, whilst very useful, do have a number of shortcomings (principally
due to data limitations).  The data sources that we have available mean that we can
redress a number of these drawbacks.  First, as the existing work concentrates only on
individual-based data, there is typically relatively limited information about the nature
of industrial relations at workplaces, including what type of union is active if at all, and
whether there is a closed shop operating.  Moreover, it is also known that some forms
of training, in particular apprenticeship, are interpreted differently by employees and
employers, so that it will be of interest in our establishment-level work to see whether
training, as defined by the employers who actually provide it, is influenced by
employee relations systems.
The second shortcoming is that the previous analyses have, in the absence of
anything better, taken union membership as the measure of unionism.  Yet membership
is only an imperfect measure of the extent of union activity (Disney, Gosling and
Machin, 1995).  A few employees may choose to join unions even though the union is
not recognised for negotiating purposes by the establishments where they work.  More
important, there are many employees for whom pay and conditions are effectively
negotiated by a union but who choose not to become members.  For this reason, a
measure of whether a union is recognised for some bargaining purposes is likely to be
a superior measure of unionism.  One indication of why this may be important comes
from an establishment-based study of unions and training in Australia (Kennedy et al,
61994).  There, also, it was found that trade unions had a positive impact on training, but
the measure of unionism mattered.  Where, simply, the proportion of union members
at a plant was used as the measure of unionism, no effect was found.  But, where
unionism was measured by whether unions were actively bargaining at the
establishment, the impact was substantial.
Finally, the third shortcoming of the previous studies is that, while they
examined the effect on the probability of receiving any training, it may also be
important to know the effect on the amount of training received by those who do
receive it. It is possible, for example, that unionism could have an impact in one
direction on the probability of receiving training but an impact in the opposite direction
on the quantity received.6
3. Data Description
Recent trends in the extent of training and unionization
Table 1 reports aggregate trends in training provision and unionization in Britain
between 1984 and 1994.  It is very clear that the Labour Force Survey data on job-related
training points to a very marked increase in the extent of training of the British
workforce between 1984 and 1994.  In 1984 about 8.3% of workers reported that they
had received some form of job-related training in the four weeks before the interview
date;  by 1994 this had risen to 14.2%.  The bulk of this increase was concentrated into
the 1984 to 1990 time period (the relevant percentage receiving job-related training in
1990 being 14.4%).
The remainder of the Table considers trends in unionization.  These have been
well documented before (Metcalf, 1991;  Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1995;  Corcoran
and Wareing, 1994).  There has been a very sharp decline in unionization among the
British labour force, which reflects a parallel decline in trade union influence at both
company level and at national and sectoral levels.  For example, the density of union
membership, defined as the proportion of employees in unions, was 58% in 1980 but
by 1993 had fallen to about 35%.  The same pattern emerges for other definitions of
union status (eg union recognition or coverage:  see Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1995).
The Employers’ Manpower and Skills Practices Survey
The Employers’ Manpower and Skills Practices Survey (EMSPS) was set up to
examine aspects of employers’ skill formation, including their skill needs, recruitment
practices and training.  It was conducted as a follow up to the 1990 Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS3) which is a nationally representative survey of 2061
British establishments with 25 or more employees in all sectors except agriculture,
forestry and fishing and coal mining. 
All WIRS3 main management respondents who said they did not mind being
recontacted were asked to participate in EMSPS.  Once unproductive and out of scope
responses were taken into account the EMSPS sample was left at 1693 establishments,
corresponding to a response rate of 89%.  Face-to-face interviews were then conducted
by experienced interviewers employed by Social and Community Planning Research
(SCPR) between November 1990 and October 1991 using a structured questionnaire.
Initial analysis of the EMSPS dataset was carried out in a series of Employment
Department Working Papers (Dench 1993a, 1993b and 1993c) and concerned itself with
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types of employer providing training, training infrastructure and aspects of continuous
training.  Dench (1993a) found that 97% of the workplaces in the survey had provided
some training for at least some of their employees during the previous year, and that
85% non-training workplaces employed less than 50 employees whilst no non-trainers
employed more than 500 employees.  Workplaces which were small, single site firms
or part of a small organisation were least likely to have provided any training as were
workplaces in the construction and metal goods sectors. 
The Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)
The second data set which we analyse is the Autumn 1993 Quarterly Labour
Force Survey (QLFS).  For the first time in that quarter, respondents were asked a set
of questions designed to find out if they worked at an establishment where a union was
recognised for bargaining purposes.  This information can then be matched against the
training data and other variables in the data set to investigate the influence of trade
union recognition at individual-level in Britain.
The QLFS is directed at a sample of about 60,000 responding households in
Great Britain every quarter (with a sample from Northern Ireland being added in
Spring).  It covers private households plus students and NHS workers living in
residential accommodation.  South of the Caledonian canal an unclustered random
sample is taken from the Postal Address File, while north of the canal households are
drawn from the public telephone directory.  Households enter the sample in waves of
about 12,000 and remain within it for five quarters.  The response rate for households
entering in Spring 1992 was 78%.  First interviews are carried out face to face, but
subsequent interviews are done on the telephone.  We restrict our analysis of these data
to employees only and exclude the Armed Forces. 
Econometric Methodology
Training incidence
As the discussion of the data sources makes clear, we pitch our analysis at two
levels, establishment- and individual-level.  For an economic agent (i = establishment,
j = individual) one can think of modelling the probability that the agent
provides/receives training in a simple discrete choice framework and estimate probit
models of training provision/receipt.  These are defined as follows:
B
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where we only observe the discrete (0-1) indicators of training receipt, P  and B , and noti j
the underlying latent dependent variables (with the * superscripts).  In (1) U denotes
union status in the establishment (and thus has an i subscript in both equations), X and
Z contain the other determinants of training that we consider (described below) and u
and e are random error terms.
In these models one can define Pr[P  = 1] as the probability that an establishmenti
trains its workers and Pr[B  = 1] as the probability an individual receive training andj
obtain the union impact on training (the marginal effect) as follows:
where M is the standard normal distribution function.  The marginal impact of U can
thus be computed by evaluating these probability differences at certain values of X or
Z:  as we are interested in the conceptual experiment that conducts a ceteris paribus
union/non-union comparison we evaluate at union means.7
To draw an appropriate ceteris paribus comparison we need to control for other
factors that may determine training incidence and which may also differ by union
status (ie properly specify the Xs and Zs).  In the establishment-level work the
following controls were included:  a set of dummy variables for establishment size; the
proportion of employees in the establishment of the occupation under consideration;
a dummy variable for private or public sector; the proportion of employees in the
establishment who are not white; the proportion of females in the establishment; the
proportion of part-timers in the establishment; a dummy variable for whether the
establishment faced any skill shortages in the last twelve months; the local labour
market unemployment rate; a dummy variable for whether the establishment faced five
or fewer competitors; eight (1-digit) industry dummy variables; and ten regional
dummy variables.
In the individual-level work the following controls were included: whether the
individual worked full-time or part-time; whether the individual  worked in the public
or private sector; whether their job was permanent or temporary; whether they were
Establishment&level intensity ' Pi.Di
Individual&level intensity ' lj.hj
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male or female; their marital status;  their level of educational qualification; length of
current job tenure and work experience;  and a set of industry, occupation and regional
controls.
Training intensity
One of the most attractive features of both surveys that we use is that they
contain more information than simple incidence measures and it is therefore possible
to compute training intensity measures.  The two that we consider are:
where D  is the average number of days training received over the last year for workersi
in establishment i, l  is whether an individual received training in the last week and hj j
is the hours of training received.  One should note, as a result of the nature of the LFS
question structure, that the individual intensity measure is a weekly measure, whilst
the incidence measure described above corresponds to the last four weeks.
It is clear that these training intensity measures are censored so we use a tobit
estimator to deal with the censoring.  These models allow for the fact that some
establishments do not provide any training for particular employees and that some
individuals have zero hours of training.  The same set of control variables was used for
this analysis as described above.  The marginal union/non-union differences are
calculated in a similar way (ie by switching on and off the union recognition dummy
variable, U ) to that described above for training provision.i
8
Descriptive statistics
Table 2  reports a set of descriptive statistics on training incidence and intensity
from EMSPS and QLFS.  The statistics are broken down by union recognition status in
all cases, and are reported separately for manual and non-manual employees.  The
definitions of training incidence are:  P , whether or not an establishment trained any ofi
its (manual or non-manual) workers in the last twelve months;  and B , whether or notj
an individual received training in the last four weeks.  In the raw data both P  and B  arei j
(significantly) higher in unionized workplaces:  in EMSPS 76% of unionized workplaces
provided training for manual workers, as compared to 50% of non-union workplaces
(comparable percentages for non-manuals are 91% and 72%);  in the QLFS 8% of manual
workers in unionized workplaces received training in the last four weeks, as compared
to 6.5% in non-union workplaces (for non-manuals the percentages were 22% and 13%
respectively).  
10
Turning to intensity, this is again higher in unionized situations.  Average training
intensity in EMSPS, defined as average days trained per worker P D , is 2.3 days fori i
manuals and 3.9 days for non-manuals in the union sector and 1.9 days for manuals and
2.0 days for non-manuals in the non-union sector.  In QLFS, where training intensity is
average hours training received in the last week, intensity is also higher in the union
sector, for both manuals and non-manuals.  In sum, these simple descriptive statistics
indicate that there is a substantially greater amount of training participation and greater
training intensity in the union sector than in the non-union sector.
4.  Estimated Models of the Determinants of Training
The incidence of training
We begin our econometric analysis by considering some simple probit models
of the determinants of training incidence, at establishment-level for the EMSPS and at
individual-level for the LFS.  These are reported in Table 3 (3a reports equations for
manual workers, 3b for non-manuals).  Three specifications are reported in each case,
the first being a simple probit regression of training incidence on union recognition
only, the second including a set of establishment-level or individual-level controls, and
the third adding a set of industry and regional dummy variables.  A marginal union
effect, calculated as described in equation (2) above, is reported in the bottom row of
the Table.
In all the reported models the estimated coefficient on the union recognition
variable is positive and statistically significant.  Once one controls for other
determinants of training incidence, the establishment-level EMSPS data suggests that
unionized establishments are some 16 to 17% more likely to provide training for
manual workers in the year preceding the survey;  they are about 8% more likely to
have provided training for non-manual workers.  In the individual-level QLFS
equations manual workers in unionized workplaces are about 1.5% more likely to have
received training in the four weeks preceding the survey;  non-manual workers are
about 5% more likely to have received such training if they work in a unionized
workplace.   According to both these data sources there is strong evidence of a positive9
link between training provision and workplace unionization.
The estimated coefficients on the other control variables seem reasonable.
According to EMSPS, training incidence is more likely for manuals and non-manuals
the bigger is the establishment, the bigger the appropriate occupational share of
employment, the fewer female workers employed in the establishment and if there are
any skill shortages.  Whether the establishment is in the public sector, faces fewer than
five competitors and the ethnic mix of employment all have insignificant coefficients.
In the individual QLFS models, individuals are more likely to receive training in larger
workplace, if they have more educational qualifications, if they are skilled (for
manuals) or professionals (for non-manuals), if they work full-time (non-manuals) and
if they work in the public sector (for non-manuals).  The other controls seem less
important.  These findings are broadly consistent with earlier research on training
determinants in Britain (Green, 1993b).
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The intensity of training
Table 4 reports a set of tobit estimates of training intensity equations.   The
structure of the Table is the same as for Table 3, with 4a reporting manual equations
and 4b non-manual equations.  In the models that incorporate the control variables the
estimated coefficient on the union recognition variable is always positive and
statistically significant. In the EMSPS models unionized establishments provide about
1.1 days extra training over the year before the survey for manual workers as compared
to non-union establishments.  For non-manuals, about 1 day extra training is provided.
In the QLFS models manual workers employed in unionized workplaces received
about 0.17 hours additional training in the previous week, whilst non-manuals received
about 0.20 hours extra.  Hence, the models of Table 3 and 4 provide strong evidence
that unions are associated with both a higher frequency and intensity of training in
British workplaces.
More detailed union effects
As noted above, the data sources that we use, especially the EMSPS data, enable
us to consider the nature of the estimated union effects in more detail.  Table 5 reports
a set of further experiments which re-specify the training equations in a number of
ways (5a reports the incidence experiments, whilst 5b reports the intensity models).
The first row of the upper panel of the Table simply reproduces the basic union
recognition effect from Tables 3 and 4.  We use these as the benchmark for comparison
purposes in the remainder of the Table.
We considered two ways of specifying more detailed union effects.  The first
focuses on situations where one expects the union wage gain to be larger, and the
second considers a possibility for union voice effects.  Considering the first of these,
existing evidence suggests that British unions raise wages by more (ie achieve a higher
union non-union wage differential) in the presence of closed shop arrangements
(Stewart, 1987, 1995) and where there are multiple unions who bargain separately
(Machin, Stewart and Van Reenen, 1993).  According to the simple union monopoly
approaches discussed in Section 2 above one would therefore expect to see lower
training activity in situations where these bigger wage gains occur.  In Table 5 we thus
breakdown the basic union recognition effect by single/multiple union status and by
whether or not there is a union membership arrangement or UMA (a UMA is defined
as the presence of closed shop arrangements or, given the outlawing of the closed shop
by 1990, where management recommends union membership ).  There is no evidence10
for a reduced training impact where unions raise wages by more:  in all cases we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for single/multiple and UMA/no UMA
establishments.
The second set of experiments breaks down the union coefficient by whether or
not the establishment has any employee involvement schemes (EI) or a joint
consultative committee (JCC).  We view these as indicating improved communication
channels and, as such, a measure of collective voice within the workplace.  According
to the specifications in Table 5 the union impact on training is always highest where a
union is recognised and there is a JCC or EI.  For manual workers the coefficient is
significantly higher in both the incidence and intensity equations.  Hence, there seems
to be some important evidence that unionized establishments with better
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communication channels are more likely to provide training.  We view this as evidence
in line with an indirect positive union influence on training via collective voice type
mechanisms.
As noted above in Section 2  some work on unions and training has found their
impact to be confined to smaller workplaces (Green, 1993).  Despite the fact that EMSPS
only covers establishments with at least 25 workers we considered potential
heterogeneity in the estimated union effect by stratifying the union effect into three size
bands (25-99 employees, 100-249 employees and 250+ employees).  With one exception
(the intensity equation for non-manuals) one cannot reject the null of no variation in the
union effect by size class.  Probably more interesting on size variations are the QLFS
equations as the QLFS data does contain workplaces of all sizes.  When we breakdown
the union effect by size (<25 and 25+ employees) we do find a bigger effect in the
smaller workplaces, and the gap is statistically significant in three of the four reported
models.  However, despite this evidence of a bigger impact in smaller workplaces (see
the marginal effects in the Table) the union impact remans positive and statistically
significant in the larger workplaces, thereby reinforcing the importance of the estimated
union effects.
Other training measures
It would be consistent with the hypothesis that unions have their positive effect
through providing a collective voice, if unions also have a positive relationship to
formal training strategies and infrastructures, and we are fortunate that the EMSPS
survey contains further rich details regarding training practices in British workplaces.
A large number of questions regarding training were asked (see Dench, 1993a, 1993b,
1993c; or Green, Machin and Wilkinson, 1995, for more details).  Table 6 considers the
relationship between three additional training variables and unionization by reporting
probit models of whether the organisation of which the establishment is part has a
training centre, a training budget or a training plan which cover the establishment.  The
models all include the same controls as used in the most detailed earlier EMSPS
equations (ie also including region and industry controls).  The results again provide
more evidence for a positive association between the extent of training practices and
unionization.  The estimated coefficients on the union variable are all positive and are
significantly different from zero in the training centre and training plan equations.  The
marginal effects suggest that unionized workplaces are 17% and 11% more likely to
have a training centre and a training plan as compared to non-union workplaces.
5.  Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the relationship between the incidence and extent of
training and union presence using establishment- and individual-level data in the early
1990s.  On the whole it presents strong evidence that unionized workers are more likely
to participate in training, for both manual and non-manual workers, and that, given
participation, they are also more likely to receive more training.  This is true of raw
data descriptions from the establishment-level Employers’ Manpower and Skills
Practices Survey of 1991 and from the individual-level Autumn 1993 Labour Force
Survey, and from econometric models that control for other determinants of training.
These effects, moreover, are quite large. Our point estimates suggest that the impact of
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unionization on average days training is 0.17 (manual and 0.20 (non-manual) hours
per-week, based on the individual-level data, or about 1 day per year, based on the
establishment-level data.  These are not inconsiderable when compared to existing
averages, namely 0.2 (manual) and 1.2 (non-manual) hours per week, or 2.1 (manual)
and 2.7 (non-manual) days per year.  These findings suggest that the rise in training
that occurred in Britain must have occurred despite the downward trend in
unionization.
Given that, at the time of the surveys, the direct role of unions in training matters
appears limited, the results should perhaps be interpreted more as reflecting their
indirect influence.  The presence of unions is likely to influence channels of
communication and management behaviour as unions provide a "voice" both for
individual grievances and contributions to productive efficiency (Freeman and Medoff,
1984).  It is probably also true that their presence is likely to make employees feel more
secure, and less threatened by changes in work practices that sometimes accompany
training.  Labour turnover will then be lower in such workplaces (Elias, 1994) allowing
for a longer period over which the benefits of training may be reaped.  There may also
be a more formal environment in unionised workplaces allowing for better
identification of training needs.
An interesting question that remains is whether the (continuing) fall in union
presence will have an impact on training participation and volume in future years and
whether the skills problems regularly cited by British employers will be exacerbated
by this fall.   The results in this paper suggest that, despite past falls in aggregate
membership, unions still have a potentially important role to play in the skill formation
process in British workplaces.  This role could be enlarged if unions succeed in their
objectives of playing a more direct role in bargaining over training.  As we have seen,
the extent of the direct role that unions play in training strategy is less than clear.  It
remains the case that management tends to regard training as an area for their own
decision making (Millward et al, 1992; Claydon and Green, 1994), but there is some
evidence that unions may have a direct but informal role in training matters in some
workplaces (Heyes, 1993; Stuart, 1994).  It is possible that the direct role of unions in
training matters will increase in the future, and this is clearly an aim of the Trades
Union Congress and several large unions.  Whatever that outcome, the findings here
suggest that the size of the union sector in the future could have a notable influence on
the extent of human capital formation in the British economy.
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1.     There is a large body of work on the relationship between labour market earnings
and training.  Most of this work regresses log wages on a training indicator to test the
simple prediction of human capital theory that training raises wages.  Some recent
examples based on US data are Lynch (1992) and Veum (1995); a recent British example
is Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1995).
2. There has been a large research agenda at the National Institute of Economic and
Social Research which compares workers in similar workplaces across different
European countries.  A recent example is Mason, Prais and van Ark (1992).
3. See, among others, Finegold and Soskice (1988) or Crouch (1992).
4. The argument is a simple one.  Suppose there are two forms of costs, wage costs
(W) and training costs (t) both defined per worker, and the employer has L workers.
Profits will be A(W, t, L) = R(L)-W.L- t.L, where R(.) is the firm revenue function.  If
unions raise W then, in the absence of any offsetting productivity effects working
through R(L), to stay in business unionised firms will have to spend less on training.
5. These theoretical arguments are set out in more detail in Claydon and Green
(1994) and in Kennedy et al (1994).
6. Although Arulampalam, Booth and Elias (1995) do use counts of the number of
times that individuals received training based on longitudinal data from the National
Child Development Survey.  Interestingly, they obtain a positive coefficient on a union
membership variable in their count data models.
7. In practice we could choose any values for X  or Z  (ie we face the usual indexi j
number issue in comparisons of this kind).  We have also considered overall sample
means and non-union means to evaluate these difference and find the overall results
are robust to this choice. The choice to evaluate these probabilities at the mean for
unionised establishments provides us with a very simple interpretation of any
union/non-union difference.  It can be thought of as the effect of taking away union
recognition, whilst holding constant all other factors, from a typical establishment that
has a recognised union.
8. For a tobit model of training intensity (I) defined (dropping the subscripts for
convenience) I  = X’b + cU + v, where I  = I for I > 0 and I  = 0 for I = 0, the marginal* * *
union effect is computed as M ((X’b+c)/F) [X’b+c+FM ]  -  M (X’b)/F) [X’b+FM ]  whereu n
F  is  the
estimated standard error of the tobit regression, M is the standard normal distribution
function, N is the normal density function and M  (k = u,n) is the appropriate Mill’sk
ratio term (u = union, n = non-union) defined as M  = N((X’b+c/F)/M((X’b+c/F) andu
M  = N((X’b/F)/M((X’b/F).n
ENDNOTES
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9.     We also estimated a probit model of training receipt in the week preceding the
survey (including the same controls as in column (6) of Table 3) and obtained
qualitatively similar results.  For manuals the estimated coefficient (standard error) on
the union recognition variable was .150 (.047) with an associated marginal effect of .009;
for non-manuals the coefficient estimate (standard error) was .153 (.025) and the
marginal effect was .026.
10. We view the management recommends membership group as ‘de facto’ closed
shops:  see Machin and Stewart (1996) for more discussion.
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TABLE 1
Aggregate Trends in the Extent of Training and Unionization
Proportion of Aggregate Proportion of Proportion of
Employees of Union Establishments Establishments
Working Age Density with Manual with Non-
Receiving Job- (Proportion Union Manual Union
Related of Workers Recognition Recognition
Training in That are
Last Four Union
Weeks (LFS ) Members)1
1984 .083  .44    .61      .50
1985 .095  .43
1986 .098  .41
1987 .108  .41
1988 .123  .40
1989 .135  .39
1990 .144  .38     .48      .43
1991 .138  .37
1992 .134  .36
1993 .134  .35
1994 .142  .33
Change, .059 -.11
1984-1994
Change, .061 -.06    -.13     -.07
1984-1990
Notes:
1. Source for training data:  Annual LFS 1984-1991; Spring Quarter QLFS 1992-
1994.
2. Source for union density data:  1984-87 – Waddington (1992);  1988 – Bird
(1990) for membership numbers and Employment Gazette, May 1990, for
employment;  1989-94 – LFS/QLFS.
3. Source for union recognition data:  Millward et al (1992).
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Descriptive Statistics
EMSPS LF
Definition Union Non- Union Non-Union Definition Union Non-Un
Union Gap (Standard
Error)
Manual Workers
Incidence P 0.755 0.499 .255 (.026) B .079 .065i j
Sample size   822   558  8568  8407
Intensity P .D 2.318 1.895 .423 (.447) l .h .700 .595i i j j
Sample size   589   386  8578  8503
Intensity for Trainers [P .D ]|P =1 3.376 3.458 -.083 (.664) [l .h ]|l =1 16.428 14.810i i i j j] j
Sample size   460   213   359   335
Non-Manual Workers
Incidence P 0.907 0.721 .185 (.021) B .217 .125i j
Sample size   834   559 17004 16954
Intensity P .D 3.909 1.973 1.936 (.332) h 1.451 .989i i j
Sample size   594   418 17056 17157
Intensity for Trainers [P .D ]|P =1 4.480 3.196 1.284 (.408) [l .h ]|l =1 12.291 13.365i i i j j] j
Sample size   529   301  2004  1258
Notes: 1. i denotes establishment, j denotes 5. D  = average numbe
individual. in last 12 months.
2. P  = 1 if provided training in last 12 months, 0 6. h  = average numberi
otherwise. in last week.
3. B  = 1 if received training in last 4 weeks, 0 7. All weighted by WIRj
otherwise.
4. l  = 1 if received training in last week, 0j
otherwise.
i
j
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 Probit Models of the Incidence of Training for Manual Employees
EMSPS QLFS1 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant  0.040 -0.617 -0.840 Constant -1.525 -1.516 -1.308
(0.053) (0.167) (0.271) (0.021) (0.064) (0.080)
Manual Union  0.847  0.475  0.499 Manual Union Recognition  0.109  0.121  0.139
Recognition (0.073) (0.099) (0.104) (0.029) (0.038) (0.039)
Manual Share of  1.479  1.624 Skilled Manual  0.183  0.205
Employment (0.142) (0.170) (0.036) (0.037)
Public Sector -0.145 -0.054 Public Sector  0.183  0.079
(0.105) (0.161) (0.042) (0.050)
Female Share of -0.910 -0.737 Female -0.001 -0.031
Employment (0.236) (0.258) (0.043) (0.046)
Part-time Share of  0.512  0.169 Work Part-time  0.042 -0.005
Employment (0.185) (0.222) (0.051) (0.053)
Non-White Share of  0.005 -0.002 Married -0.063 -0.061
Employment (0.030) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Skill Shortage in  0.135  0.197 Potential Experience -0.038 -0.040
Establishment (0.089) (0.093) (0.005) (0.005)
Fewer than Five  0.013  0.064 Potential Experience  0.0004  0.0005
Competitors (0.103) (0.109) Squared (0.0001) (0.0001)
Establishment with 50-  0.239  0.262 Temporary Employment  0.040  0.045
99 Employees (0.133) (0.139) (0.063) (0.063)
Establishment with  0.288  0.289 Job Tenure  0.0001  0.0002
100-199 Employees (0.133) (0.138) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Establishment with   0.390  0.414 Degree  0.717  0.668
200-499 Employees (0.142) (0.148) (0.124) (0.124)
Establishment with  0.550  0.631 Further Education  0.807  0.754
500-999 Employees (0.167) (0.171) (0.078) (0.078)
Establishment with  1.098  1.211 A Level  0.544  0.513
1000 or more (0.177) (0.183) (0.059) (0.059)
Employees
Apprenticeship  0.366  0.346
(0.050) (0.050)
O Level  0.521  0.506
(0.054) (0.054)
CSE  0.285  0.278
(0.063) (0.063)
Other Qualification  0.261  0.246
(0.062) (0.062)
Workplace Size >25  0.076  0.074
employees (0.038) (0.039)
Industry & Region      No     No     Yes Industry & Region No No Yes
Dummies Dummies
Log-Likelihood -783.0 -582.9 -557.7 Log-Likelihood -4346.8 -3942.2 -3914.0
Sample size  1380 1224 1224 Sample size 16975 16790 16790
Mean of Dependent  0.606  0.613  0.613 Mean of Dependent  0.072  0.072  0.072
Variable Variable
Marginal Union Effect  0.297  0.164  0.171 Marginal Union Effect  0.015  0.014  0.015
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is whether any training was provided for manual employees in the last year.
2. Dependent variable is whether any training was received by manual employees in the last four weeks.
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Probit Models of the Incidence of Training for Non-Manual Employees
EMSPS QLFS1 2
     (1)     (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
Constant  0.784 -0.023 -0.583 Constant -1.148 -1.239 -1.101
(0.059) (0.161) (0.298)  (0.012) (0.046) (0.054)
Non-Manual Union  0.627  0.393  0.434 Non-Manual Union  0.364  0.199  0.199
Recognition (0.087) (0.122) (0.128) Recognition (0.016) (0.021)  (0.022)
Non-Manual Share of  1.546  2.003 Professional Worker  0.046  0.058
Employment (0.207) (0.254) (0.020) (0.020)
Public Sector  0.009  0.197 Public Sector  0.209  0.111
(0.144) (0.194) (0.021) (0.029)
Female Share of -0.133 -0.256 Female  0.031  0.010
Employment (0.258) (0.288) (0.019) (0.020)
Part-time Share of  0.297  0.154 Part-time -0.154 -0.148
Employment (0.201) (0.260) (0.023) (0.024)
Non-White Share of -0.022 -0.053 Married -0.086 -0.087
Employment (0.036) (0.044) (0.020) (0.020)
Skill Shortage in  0.200  0.291 Potential Experience -0.012 -0.013
Establishment (0.109) (0.117) (0.003) (0.003)
Fewer than Five -0.205 -0.199 Potential Experience  0.00001  0.00000
Competitors (0.109) (0.119) Squared (0.00005) (0.00006)
Establishment with  0.190  0.183 Temporary  0.003 -0.005
50-99 Employees (0.145) (0.152) Employment (0.034) (0.034)
Establishment 100-199  0.312  0.292 Job Tenure -0.0004 -0.0004
Employees (0.151) (0.157) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Establishment 200-499  0.506  0.534 Degree  0.568  0.526
Employees (0.164) (0.172) (0.041) (0.042)
Establishment 500-999  0.545  0.658 Further Education  0.644  0.613
Employees (0.195) (0.206) (0.041) (0.041)
Establishment with  1.227  1.415 A Level  0.491  0.468
1000 or more (0.260) (0.278) (0.041) (0.041)
Employees
Apprenticeship  0.272  0.258
(0.044) (0.045)
O Level  0.349  0.328
(0.039) (0.040)
CSE  0.137  0.125
(0.052) (0.052)
Other Qualification  0.328  0.307
(0.052) (0.052)
Workplace Size >25  0.037  0.045
Employees (0.020) (0.020)
Industry & Region      No     No     Yes Industry & Region No No Yes
Dummies Dummies
Log-Likelihood -522.7 -411.4 -389.6 Log-Likelihood -15280.2 -14384.2 -14350.9
Sample size 1393 1226 1226 Sample size 33958 33314 33314
Mean of Dependent  0.803  0.799  0.799 Mean of Dependent  0.171  0.173  0.173
Variable Variable
Marginal Union Effect  0.137  0.077  0.082 Marginal Union Effect  0.091  0.052  0.051
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is whether any training was provided for non-manual employees in the last year.
2. Dependent variable is whether any training was received by non-manual employees in the last four weeks.
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Tobit Models of the Intensity of Training for Manual Employees
EMSPS QLFS1 2
     (1)     (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
Constant -1.286 -1.396  0.246 Constant -68.732 -55.246 -50.668
(0.439) (1.220) (1.762) (2.598) (3.277) (3.752)
Manual Union  1.835  2.510  2.370 Manual Union  1.375  5.637  6.475
Recognition (0.542) (0.686) (0.709) Recognition (1.334)  (1.578)  (1.624)
Manual Share of  2.357  2.846 Skilled Manual  5.487  6.372
Employment (1.008) (1.121) (1.492) (1.534)
Public Sector -2.157 -1.401 Public Sector  2.451  0.142
(0.692) (0.998) (1.804) (2.146)
Female Share of -3.322 -3.846 Female -1.326 -2.085
Employment (1.616) (1.741) (1.757) (1.845)
Part-time Share of  2.811  0.136 Work Part-time  4.489  3.489
Employment (1.198) (1.374) (2.016) (2.084)
Non-White Share of  0.230  0.395 Married -1.530 -1.402
Employment (0.210) (0.249) (1.625) (1.630)
Skill Shortage in  0.410  0.682 Potential Experience -1.742 -1.766
Establishment (0.594) (0.598) (0.197) (0.198)
Fewer than Five -0.978 -0.570 Potential Experience  0.022  0.022
Competitors (0.660) (0.678) Squared (0.004) (0.004)
Establishment with 50- -1.151 -1.180 Temporary  1.204  1.301
99 Employees (0.976) (0.966) Employment (2.453) (2.461)
Establishment with 100- -1.049 -1.204 Job Tenure -0.010 -0.009
199 Employees (0.979) (0.971) (0.009) (0.009)
Establishment with 200- -0.719 -0.616 Degree 17.323 16.103
499 Employees (0.994) (0.993) (5.106) (5.110)
Establishment with 500-  0.018  0.700 Further Education 19.636 18.366
999 Employees (1.079) (1.078) (3.368) (3.377)
Establishment with 1000 -0.611 -0.082 A Level 15.497 14.633
or more Employees (1.075) (1.072) (2.491) (2.495)
Apprenticeship 10.278  9.477
(2.170) (2.179)
O Level 15.096 14.787
(2.260) (2.269)
CSE  7.683  7.543
(2.628) (2.633)
Other Qualification  6.852  6.572
(2.747) (2.764)
Workplace Size >25  1.761  2.143
employees (1.560) (1.601)
Industry & Region      No     No     Yes Industry & Region No No Yes
Dummies Dummies
Log-Likelihood -2524.6 -2253.1 -2227.8 Log-Likelihood -5503.0 -5137.8 -5123.5
Sample size  975  874  874 Sample size 17081 16893 16893
Mean of Dependent  2.080  2.133  2.133 Mean of Dependent  0.647  0.643  0.643
Variable Variable
Marginal Union Effect  0.882  1.170  1.113 Marginal Union  0.056  0.154  0.169
Effect
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the proportion of manual employees receiving training in the last year multiplied by
the average number of days training they received.
2. Dependent variable is the number of hours training received in the last week.
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Tobit Models of the Intensity of Training for Non-Manual Employees
EMSPS QLFS1 2
     (1)     (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
Constant  0.900 -1.102 -0.573 Constant -40.839 -36.102 -33.075
(0.307) (0.758) (1.282) (0.770) (1.532) (1.750)
Non-Manual Union  1.410  1.520  1.706 Non-Manual Union  6.815  3.710  3.659
Recognition (0.393) (0.499) (0.516) Recognition (0.534) (0.650) (0.658)
Non-Manual Share of  0.807  0.871 Professional Worker  0.888  1.118
Employment (0.733) (0.866) (0.619) (0.622)
Public Sector -0.148 -0.081 Public Sector  4.623  2.759
(0.537) (0.728) (0.647) (0.895)
Female Share of  1.413  1.112 Female -0.621 -1.007
Employment (1.181) (1.267) (0.582) (0.590)
Part-time Share of  3.403  1.863 Work Part-time -0.431 -0.078
Employment (0.899) (1.060) (0.687) (0.707)
Non-White Share of  0.370  0.090 Married -2.760 -2.791
Employment (0.144) (0.169) (0.618) (0.618)
Skill Shortage in  0.671  0.956 Potential Experience -0.609 -0.637
Establishment (0.433) (0.438) (0.080) (0.081)
Fewer than Five -0.570 -0.151 Potential Experience  0.004  0.005
Competitors (0.485) (0.501) Squared (0.002) (0.002)
Establishment 50-99  1.153  1.193 Temporary Employment  2.924  2.763
Employees (0.694) (0.689) (0.972) (0.972)
Establishment 100-199  0.291  0.237 Job Tenure -0.010 -0.010
Employees (0.704) (0.697) (0.004) (0.004)
Establishment 200-499  1.203  1.291 Degree 11.361 10.326
Employees (0.710) (0.710) (1.294) (1.314)
Establishment with 500- -0.433 -0.049 Further Education 13.965 13.137
999 Employees (0.802) (0.801) (1.293) (1.310)
Establishment with 1000  0.029  0.313 A Level 10.857 10.174
or more Employees (0.772) (0.769) (1.288) (1.300)
Apprenticeship  5.245  4.851
(1.422) (1.428)
O Level  7.507  6.962
(1.242) (1.249)
CSE  1.778  1.416
(1.645) (1.650)
Other Qualification  6.953  6.415
(1.651) (1.658)
Workplace Size >25  0.620  0.711
employees (0.604) (0.611)
Industry & Region      No     No     Yes Industry & Region No No Yes
Dummies Dummies
Log-Likelihood -2798.1 -2455.6 -2434.6 Log-Likelihood -22292.6 -21585.5 -21568.3
Sample size  1012  898  898 Sample size 34213 33565 33565
Mean of Dependent  2.814  2.746  2.746 Mean of Dependent  1.218  1.238  1.238
Variable Variable
Marginal Union Effect  0.855  0.940  1.037 Marginal Union Effect  0.634  0.213  0.200
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the proportion of non-manual employees receiving training in the last year
multiplied by the average number of days training they received.
2. Dependent variable is the number of hours training received in the last week.
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More Detailed Union Effects on Training Participation
Manuals Non-Manuals
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Margina
Effect l Effect
EMSPS
Recognition  0.499 (0.104)  0.171  0.434 (0.128)  0.082
Single / Multiple Union
Single Union  0.486 (0.115)  0.167  0.377 (0.140)  0.098
Multiple Union  0.520 (0.131)  0.179  0.538 (0.168)  0.075
P  Test of Equality of Coefficients (p-  0.07  (0.793)  0.95  (0.330)2
value)
Union Membership Arrangements
No UMA  0.519 (0.116)  0.180  0.359 (0.139)  0.064
UMA  0.438 (0.130)  0.143  0.560 (0.170)  0.130
P  Test of Equality of Coefficients (p-  0.43  (.511)  1.49  (.222)2
value)
JCC and Employee Involvement
No Recognition, but JCC or EI  0.438 (0.140)  0.173  0.296 (0.148)  0.092
Recognition, but no JCC and EI  0.531 (0.180)  0.196  0.494 (0.218)  0.142
Recognition and JCC or EI  0.879 (0.149)  0.316  0.672 (0.168)  0.159
P  Test of Equality of Recognition  5.15  (.023)  1.54  (.214)2
Coefficients (p-value)
Recognition Interacted with Size
Dummies
25-99 Employees  0.361 (0.147)  0.128  0.529 (0.180)  0.114
100-249 Employees  0.527 (0.168)  0.178  0.533 (0.206)  0.080
250 or more Employees  0.681 (0.163)  0.213  0.209 (0.203)  0.021
P  Test of Equality of Coefficients (p-  2.33  (.313)  2.16  (0.340)2
value)
QLFS
Recognition  0.139 (0.039)  0.015  0.199 (0.022)  0.051
Recognition Interacted with Size
Dummies 
Less than 25 Employees  0.331 (0.070)  0.036  0.337 (0.035)  0.082
25 or more Employees  0.081 (0.042)  0.007  0.139 (0.025)  0.032
P  Test of Equality of Coefficients (p-  10.59 (0.010)  25.03 (0.000)2
value)
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More Detailed Union Effects on Training Intensity
Manuals Non-Manuals
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Margina
Effect l Effect
EMSPS
Recognition  2.370 (0.709)  1.113  1.706 (0.516)  1.037
Single / Multiple Union
Single Union  2.236 (0.775)  1.054  1.925 (0.578)  1.212
Multiple Union  2.583 (0.866)  1.189  1.426 (0.613)  0.837
P  Test of Equality of  0.18  (0.668)  0.71  (0.400)2
Coefficients (p-value)
Union Membership
Arrangements
No UMA  2.154 (0.778)  0.988  1.459 (0.557)  0.943
UMA  2.466 (0.833)  1.217  2.182 (0.636)  1.435
P  Test of Equality of  0.18  (0.671)  1.59  (0.208)2
Coefficients (p-value)
JCC and Employee
Involvement
No Recognition, but JCC or EI  3.149 (1.041)  1.286  2.521 (0.675)  1.410
Recognition, but no JCC and EI  2.893 (1.239)  1.116  3.524 (0.908)  1.829
Recognition and JCC or EI  5.164 (1.063)  2.180  3.374 (0.700)  1.902
P  Test of Equality of  6.14  (0.014)  0.04  (0.837)2
Recognition Coefficients (p-
value)
Recognition Interacted with
Size Dummies
25-99 Employees  2.436 (1.010)  1.146  3.640 (0.749)  2.333
100-249 Employees  2.454 (1.188)  1.156  1.325 (0.849)  0.749
250 or more Employees  2.230 (1.050)  1.037 -0.033 (0.718) -0.017
P  Test of Equality of  0.02  (0.982)  7.02  (0.001)2
Coefficients (p-value)
QLFS
Recognition  6.475 (1.624)  0.169  3.659 (0.658)  0.200
Recognition Interacted with
Size Dummies 
Less than 25 Employees  9.766 (2.988)  0.294  5.219 (1.060)  0.522
25 or more Employees  5.501 (1.788)  0.143  2.968 (0.752)  0.275
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P  Test of Equality of  1.71  (0.191)  3.52  (0.061)
Coefficients
TABLE 6
Other Training Measures
Sample Proportion of Recognition Margin
Size Establishments Coefficient al Effect
with Training (Standard
Centre/Budget/ Error)
Plan
Training Centre or School  1232  0.563  0.441 (0.103)  0.173
Covering Employees at
Establishment
Training Budget Which  1440  0.544  0.063 (0.096)  0.024
Covers the Establishment
Training Plan Which  1440  0.538  0.285 (0.093)  0.113
Covers the Establishment
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